New Oregon Law Restricting Use Of Credits Checks For Employment Purposes May Signal National Trend

Last week, Oregon joined a growing national trend, apparently in response to the recession and the foreclosure crisis, that restricts the ability of employers to use credit history in employment decisions. Under the Oregon law, it is an unlawful employment practice, except in limited circumstances, for an Oregon employer to use credit history in making hiring decisions or any decision affecting current employees. The law confers on Oregon employees the right to file an administrative complaint or a private lawsuit claiming that the law has been violated. Employees who prevail may recover lost wages and attorney fees. The law becomes effective July 1, 2010.

Hawaii and Washington have recently enacted similar laws. Bills currently are pending in the following states: Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Legislation also is pending in the United States House of Representatives to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to prohibit use of consumer credit checks in employment decisions.

There are several exceptions to the new Oregon prohibition. Specifically, federally insured banks and credit unions, businesses required by law to consider employee credit history, and police and other public employers hiring for law enforcement and airport security may still conduct credit checks. In addition, the law contains a somewhat vaguely worded exception that permits employers to conduct credit checks for “substantially job-related reasons,” so long as those reasons are disclosed to the employee in writing.

Employers should exercise caution in applying the “substantially job related” exception. It is unclear as yet how that exception will be interpreted, either by regulation or the courts. In the meantime, employers should consider obtaining a credit check on an applicant or employee only in those situations where the results of the check would have a significant bearing upon the determination whether the applicant or employee can perform essential job functions and even then should consult with counsel before relying on this exception.

This entry was written by Philip L. Gordon and Jennifer A. Nelson.

GINA Becomes Effective November 21, 2009: Are You Ready?

Four centrifuge tubes of fifteen milliliter volume in a rack in a science laboratory

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) takes effect on November 21, 2009. How does GINA impact employers? GINA does the following: (a) prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee based upon genetic information, (b) places broad restrictions on an employer’s deliberate acquisition of genetic information, (c) mandates confidentiality for genetic information that employers lawfully collect; (d) strictly limits disclosure of such information, and (e) prohibits retaliation against employees who complain about genetic discrimination.

Some of the more obvious violations of this new law occur when an employer requires a worker to take a genetic test or fires the worker based on information about such a test. However, employers can run afoul of GINA in a number of other ways they may not anticipate because the Act broadly defines “genetic information” to include not only genetic test results but also any information about the manifestation of a disease or disorder in a family member, such family medical history. For example, employers should tell health care providers who conduct post-offer, pre-employment medical examinations not to disclose to the employer the results of any family medical history or other genetic information. This example highlights the attention employers must now pay to GINA, violations of which subject employers to the same remedies as violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The EEOC had a deadline of May 21, 2009, to issue final regulations interpreting GINA’s employment-related provisions. With the Act’s effective date less than one week away, the EEOC still had not published final regulations. Further guidance on GINA’s requirements will be provided when the EEOC issues its final regulations. In the meantime, employers will find below a number of suggestions for complying with GINA.

Have You Taken These Steps to Comply with GINA Yet?

• Train human resources personnel, managers and recruiters about compliance with GINA, especially the provisions generally prohibiting deliberate acquisition of genetic information.

• Post a new EEO nondiscrimination poster prohibiting information based on genetic information.

• Revise EEO policies to include prohibitions against discrimination based on genetic information and associated retaliation.

• Discontinue requests to applicants and employees for family medical history except in the limited circumstances permitted in connection with a wellness or disease management program. (See Littler’s recent ASAP, which explains this exception.)

• Whenever requesting an employee to have medical professionals provide documentation, such as in connection with a fitness-for-duty exam or a request for a reasonable accommodation or leave, add a statement that family medical history or other genetic information should not be provided.

• Inventory personnel records--such as FMLA certifications seeking leave for the serious illness of a family member--that contain genetic information about an employee, store those records in a confidential medical file, and strictly limit access to those with a need to know.

• Implement procedures to prevent the disclosure of genetic information in response to a subpoena or civil discovery and to permit disclosure only when specifically required to comply with a court order. 

This entry was written by Ilyse Schuman and Philip Gordon.

Photo by Jonathan Lenz.

The D.C. Circuit Leaves Undisturbed the Ability of Employers to Ban Union Communications Using Corporate E-Mail

Many had anticipated a dramatic rejection of Register-Guard, the National Labor Relations Board's landmark December 2007 decision, which held that employees could not use their employer's e-mail system as a matter of right to engage in union-related activities or union solicitation (see our previous blog entry). Instead, on July 7, 2009, the D.C. Circuit let that decision stand, effectively holding that the newspaper in that case did not violate federal law by issuing a policy banning all solicitations, including union solicitations, from its corporate e-mail system.

The court nonetheless concluded that the newspaper had engaged in unfair labor practices in the way it applied the policy. The court found that one of the e-mails that resulted in discipline of the employee—who was also the union president—was union-related, but was not a solicitation. Consequently, the union president did not violate the newspaper’s electronic resources policy by sending it. The other two e-mails upon which the newspaper had relied to discipline the employee were solicitations that violated the company’s policy. However, the newspaper's lax enforcement of the policy vis-à-vis non-union-related messages and its after-the-fact justification for applying the policy to the employee's messages demonstrated unlawful discrimination against union activities. 

 

The employer's mistakes in Register-Guard were that (a) it did not enforce its policy against other non-business solicitations, even though the policy prohibited all "non-job-related solicitations;" and (b) it enforced the policy only when the solicitation in question was on behalf of a union.

Whether the Obama Board will continue to allow employers to ban union communications on their e-mail systems remains uncertain. Regardless, employers should consider the following:

• Employers can impose broad restrictions, such as e-mail only for work-related purposes, even if the prohibition incidentally interferes with communications that might otherwise be protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act as long as the policy on its face does not discriminate against union activity.

• Employers can draft the policy in a manner that will capture union-related activities in addition to union solicitation.

• Employers should confirm that legitimate, non-discriminatory justifications exist for their line drawing, such as protecting against computer viruses, dissemination of confidential information, preventing losses of productivity, preserving server space, and avoiding company liability for employees' inappropriate e-mail.

• Before disciplining an employee for violating the policy by engaging in union-related activity, confirm that the communication, in fact, violated the policy. Moreover, check that other employees who have engaged in similar conduct also have been disciplined.

• Implement procedures to ensure that the policy is enforced in a non-discriminatory manner.

This entry was authored by Laurent R. G. Badoux and Philip L. Gordon.

For additional analysis of this development, see Littler’s ASAP “The D.C. Circuit Reminds Employers of the Perils of Selectively Enforcing Their Solicitation and E-Mail Policies Against Union-Related Activities” by Laurent R.G. Badoux, Jennifer L. Mora and Kathryn E. Siegel.
 

Ensuring the Privacy of Transgender Employees in the Face of Public Transition

Transgender individuals have good reason to be concerned about expressing their gender identity in the workplace. According to recent studies, at least one in five transgender individuals reports experiencing employment discrimination. A review of six studies conducted between 1996 and 2006 showed the following concerning reports of mistreatment in the workplace based on gender identity:

  • 13%-56% of transgender individuals had been fired;
  • 13%-47% had been denied employment;
  • 22%-31% had been harassed, either verbally or physically, in the workplace; and
  • 19% had been denied a promotion due to their transgender status.

Most employees choose whether, when, and to whom they disclose certain personal information at work. However, transgender individuals who decide to transition from one gender to another while remaining with their current employer do not have the same luxury. This largely is due to the inherently public nature of the transition. Indeed, an employee who intends to undergo a gender transition generally is required to live full-time in their new gender role for at least a year before becoming eligible to undergo sex reassignment and reconstruction surgery (if they so choose to have surgery, which many do not). During this time frame, transgender individuals often seek a variety of medical treatments, including hormone therapy, as well as change their names, modify their identity documents, and other procedures. As a result, employers and co-workers necessarily, but often reluctantly, become involved in a transitioning employee’s gender transition. While a gender transition is an inherently private process, it necessarily becomes known to co-workers at some point by the very nature of the “transition.”

What does that mean for an employer who receives notice that an employee intends to transition from one gender to another over the course of several weeks or months? More importantly, how does an employer reconcile this very public transition with potential state and federal laws protecting confidential medical information, which requires employers to maintain private information about an employee, and protect against potential common law claims like invasion of privacy?  This is made more difficult by the very nature of the public transition for transgender employees. For all practical purposes, it is somewhat similar to when an employee discloses to limited individuals that she is pregnant.  Employers must not and should not disclose this fact (that is private until the pregnant employee begins “to show”) to others who do not need to know or confirm this information to colleagues. And while such information may inherently or eventually become public due to an employee’s appearance, it necessarily is up to the employee to decide when and to whom to disclose such information.  

Such is the case with an employee who announces an intention to change gender. An employee’s transgender status, where the employee is in the process of transitioning, and especially the employee’s medical condition and/or plans for future medical procedures, must be treated as private and confidential. The decision of with whom and when a transgender employee shares such information should be left to the employee’s discretion. Medical information also may be received by employers in a variety of ways and circumstances. Depending on the nature of that information and how it is received, the information may be protected under federal laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Genetic Information Discrimination Act (GINA), or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (which does excludes transgender status from the definition of disability, but protects most medical information of current employees). Regardless, out of sheer courtesy to the employee, the information should not be disseminated or the discussion of office chatter.

 

In addition to privacy concerns, employers should be aware that more and more cases are expanding the boundaries of discrimination under Title VII, and most particularly the definition of “sex.” In September 2008, the federal court of the District of Columbia ruled that the Library of Congress discriminated against Diane Schroer on the basis of “sex.” Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2nd 293 (D.D.C. 2008). While dressed in traditionally masculine clothing and interviewing under her previous male name, Schroer was offered a job as a Terrorism Research Analyst with the Congressional Research Service, a division of the Library of Congress. After the job offer, but before starting and before undergoing sex reassignment surgery, Schroer informed the Library of Congress that she was under a doctor’s care for gender dysphoria. Schroer informed her future employer that, consistent with her treatment, she was about to change her name, begin dressing in traditionally feminine attire, and presenting herself full-time as a woman. The job offer was rescinded one day after Schroer disclosed her plans to transition. This groundbreaking decision was the first time a court has ruled that discriminating against someone for changing gender is sex discrimination under Title VII. While case law usually develops a bit slower, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) still is on the horizon. With a new administration and Congress, most predict that the version of ENDA likely to be introduced will add to Title VII express protections for gender identity or expression (in addition to sexual orientation). 

 

So, how does an employer manage to maintain this balance while also fostering a non-discriminatory work environment where all employees are treated with trust and respect? Some helpful guidelines include:

 

  • Amend your Equal Employment Opportunity policy to prohibit discrimination based on gender identity or expression. (Several states, most recently New Hampshire and Washington, have passed bills protecting individuals on the basis of gender identity or expression. See also Jurisdictions with Explicitly Trans-Inclusive Discrimination Laws.)
  • Be prepared to address questions and requests from employees who notify you of their intent to transition to a different gender.
  • Write and implement a detailed policy and procedures suited to your own workplace environment to aid management, and the transitioning employee when a transgender employee decides to transition on the job.
  • Do not make decisions about how to respond to certain requests from a transitioning individual based on where an employee is in the transition process.
  • Keep in mind, at all times, that transitioning to a new gender is much more intense and intimate than simply ”changing one’s name” and dressing differently; this process truly is life-altering.

This entry was authored by Denise Visconti, a shareholder in Littler's San Diego office.

NLRB Broadens Employers' Ability To Ban Union Communications Using Corporate E-Mail

In a highly anticipated decision, the National Labor Relations Board has emphatically landed on the side of employers whose policies bar employees from using corporate e-mail resources for union activities.

In The Guard Publishing Co. d/b/a The Register Guard, the Board, in a 3-2 decision, held that “employees have no statutory right to use an employer’s equipment or media for Section 7 communications.”  Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act  encompasses communications about virtually all union activities by employees, including solicitation, organizing, grievances, picketing, strikes, and discussions about the terms and conditions of employment.  In light of this ruling, an employer may, in the words of the Board, “lawfully bar employees’ nonwork-related use of its e-mail systems,” including use for union activities.

There is a caveat, but as defined by the Board, the caveat is a narrow one:  Employers can not act “in a manner that discriminates against Section 7 activity.” (emphasis supplied).  Significantly, the Guard Publishing decision substantially narrows the prior definition of “discrimination” for purposes of analyzing whether an e-mail policy (or any other policy restricting Section 7 activities) on its face, or as enforced by the employer, interferes with Section 7 rights.

Under prior precedent, the Board would find “discrimination” where, for example, an employer disciplined an employee for using corporate resources to send union-related e-mail but permitted any other e-mail communications unrelated to work, such as invitations to bridal showers, recruiting for fantasy football leagues, or solicitations for charitable contributions.  Because almost every employer, upon close scrutiny, allows some e-mail unrelated to work — even if the “official” policy prohibits e-mail unrelated to work – this definition of “discrimination” effectively prevented employers from enforcing restrictions on union-related communications using corporate e-mail systems.

The Board overruled this prior precedent, explaining that “unlawful discrimination consists of disparate treatment of activities or communication of a similar character because of their union or other Section 7-protected status.”  The Board provided several examples to illustrate this much narrower definition of “discrimination”:  “an employer clearly would violate the [NLRA] if it permitted employees to use e-mail to solicit for one union but not another, or if it permitted solicitation by antiunion employees but not by prounion employees.”  By contract, the Board explained, any of the following policies would be permissible (i.e., non-discriminatory), even if the policy incidentally interfered with union communications:

Ø      A policy permitting only business-related communications

Ø      A policy barring all solicitations

Ø      A policy permitting only charitable solicitations

Ø      A policy permitting solicitations only of a personal nature

The one remaining catch is that an employer’s motivation for line-drawing can not be anti-union animus.  In other words, an employer can not promulgate a policy that permits only charitable solicitations as a subterfuge for suppressing union-related communications over the corporate e-mail system.

What does Guard Publishing mean, in practical terms, for employers?

First, existing corporate e-mail policies most likely do not need to be revised (except in the unlikely event that the policy expressly prohibits union-related communications while permitting communications related to other membership organizations).  Employers should review their existing polices to ensure that they comply with the Board’s decision in Guard Publishing.

Second, employers who revise their e-mail policy, or prepare one for the first time, can impose broad prohibitions, such as e-mail only for work-related purposes, even if the prohibition incidentally interferes with Section 7 communications.

Third, when promulgating a new or revised e-mail policy, employers should have legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for their line drawing, such as preserving server space, protecting against computer viruses, dissemination of confidential information, preventing losses of productivity, and avoiding company liability for employees’ inappropriate e-mail.

Fourth, before disciplining an employee for using corporate e-mail to communicate about union-related activities, an employer should confirm that the communication, in fact, violated existing policy.  In Guard Publishing, the NLRB found that the employer had violated the NLRA by disciplining an employee who sent an e-mail which did relate to union matters but did not solicit employees to join the union and, therefore, did not violate the newspaper’s policy barring “non-job-related solicitations.”

Fifth, employers can discipline employees for using corporate e-mail to send union-related communications in violation of the employer's e-mail policy as long as employees engaged in similar conduct also are disciplined.  In other words, an employee can be disciplined for soliciting union participation only if employees who solicit participation in other membership organizations also are, or will be, disciplined.  Employers should implement procedures to ensure that they enforce their e-mail policy in a non-discriminatory manner.

The Board’s decision may be appealed. We will continue to comment on developments in this important case.  (For more in-depth analysis of this decision, see Littler ASAP "NLRB Rules That Employers May Implement a Corporate E-mail Policy That Has the Effect of Barring Union-Related Communications" by Philip Gordon and Michael Mankes.)